This brings forward an interesting dilemma. Can social-commercial entities truely be commercial? Should there be limits to how "commercial" they are in order not to lose the "social" part? Should financial services to the poor at all be done in a "for profit" way?
This is a hard question to answer, because in reality, there is nothing to stop a commercial company from pursuing their shareholder's commercial interest. Well, they supposedly work in a market economy, but (obviously) that economy is not functioning well in a place that allows interest rates of more than 100%.
I have always been a fan of these socio-commercial MFIs, and I've touted the greatness and efficiency of companies like Prisma Microfinance in Central America and Mifex in Ecuador (although the latter isn't really a declared "for profit" entity). I believe that a commercial setup creates sustainability and efficiency for an MFI, and having multiple players in the market (competition!) will make sure that the borrowers get the best deal.
Still, Compartamos (meaning "Let's Share" in Spanish) didn't do a real good job at, what's supposedly at the heart of their organization-- providing services that allow poor entrepreneurs and home owners to increase their wealth or standard of living.
I think that the discussion about "for profit" vs. "not for profit" is a hard one to be had. Even though nobody (except for the commercial investors) really feels good about making millions of dollars over the backs of the poor, the way to address this is probably not by making commercial MFIs less commercial. I think that commercial MFIs would need to put in safeguards in their business model that ensures that the "social" part of a "social-commercial entity" doesn't get lost in the shuffle. And that can be done various ways:
- Like the Grameen bank does, they can provide equity to their borrowers. This is a very interesting idea, but not necessarily very effective, as the borrowers really cannot do anything with their equity until the company goes public or is sold to a publicly listed company.
- They can provide direct "cash back" for the loan in a profit sharing scheme. The cash back could be invested in a savings account at the same MFI or at another (regulated) savings institute. This could be used to slowly build confidence of the borrower in the banking system, so they learn to retain savings (however small) in financial equivalents and institutionalized investments rather than in direct investment in goods and property. The cash-back could be constructed in such a way that it reduced the profits of the company, and therefore reduces the tax basis.
- The investors in the company can make stipulations about use of capital and social impact of their investment. In the case of Compartamos, early investments were done by Acción and other social investors; only later investments were done by purely commercial investors. If Acción or other early investors would have stipulated that their investment AND the possible future growth that their investment enables, was bound to some "rules of the games" protecting the consumers, nobody would have been whining now. In all honesty, if they had done that, chances would have been good that Compartamos wouldn't have gone IPO, and the possibility exists that purely commercial investors wouldn't have invested in the company because their upside would have been limited by the social manifest of the company.
- Compete, compete, compete. The reason for the high interest rates in Mexico isn't inflation. It is not related to (amply available) government regulation or taxation-- the latter is only done over the PROFIT, not over the INCOME (see this post from Kendall Mau). It is purely related to the lack of feasible competition.
2 comments:
Ramon, throughout all this discussion, I've been puzzled by the lack of an insider's financial view of whether Compartamos raped or didn't rape its customers. Two statistics can easily indicate that.
What was the Return on Assets after taxes? Net Income after taxes divided by total assets. An examiner would be looking for 5-8%. If way above, you're looking at a bad situation.
Then look at the total expenses and divide by total assets. If it's more than 10%, it indicates inefficieny. That combined with a high ROA raises the red flag sky high.
To date, no one has delved into these 2 ratios. If you're a GM or CFO of an MFI, this is what you're supposed to be keeping your eyes on. Most of the other ratios are little more than noise.
Kendall
I agree with you that someone should do a good, analytic-financial review of the merger. Still, whatever the reason is for interest rates of >100% (greed or inefficiency, or high external costs like taxes and levies), I think that it makes it hard to justify that the operation is one to reduce poverty.
Possibility 1: they are not very efficient -- reorganizing their operation, possibly under pressure of competition may help
Possibility 2: they are greedy. To me, that's also a sign of lack of market maturity. Competition will help here, but restraint by the MFI, if they at all want themselves to be considered to be for the greater good, would not be out of place.
Possibility 3: the tax climate is such, that interest rates need to be through the roof in order to get to a ROA of 5-8%. In this case, I'd expect Compartamos to be screaming "murder" to the federal (Mexican) government, and the paper being full of accusations of the government getting rich over the back of the poor. Haven't heard that. Also, it appears to me that some MFIs in Mexico are able to make ends meet with a lot lower interest rate. Take AlSol, which has a Kiva reported rate of 36%. Regardless of what this "36%" actually means, it's only 1/3 of what Compartamos charges. Yes, maybe you can't really compare the two (Compartamos could be addressing a completely different part of the MF market/population/geography/risk group), but it shows that tax is probably not the main factor that makes a >100% interest rate necessary.
For me, the main question is not so much if Compartamos is a good or a bad lender; it's more about what can be done to provide the poor with AFFORDABLE MF solutions. I think that eventually, the market forces will cause the the borrower cost to come down in a way that is comparable to how mortgages work in the US. What needs to be done to help this market mature to that level?
Post a Comment